Sound, Basic Education: North Carolina Adopts an Adequacy Standard in Leandro v. State by Packard, William Kent
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 76 | Number 4 Article 8
4-1-1998
Sound, Basic Education: North Carolina Adopts an
Adequacy Standard in Leandro v. State
William Kent Packard
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
William K. Packard, Sound, Basic Education: North Carolina Adopts an Adequacy Standard in Leandro v. State, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1481
(1998).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol76/iss4/8
A Sound, Basic Education: North Carolina Adopts an
Adequacy Standard in Leandro v. State
"Is it not almost a self-evident axiom that the State should
require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of every
human being who is born its citizen?"' This question, posed by John
Stuart Mill in his influential work On Liberty, intrinsically accepts
that all children should not only be required to receive an education,'
but also that each child should obtain a minimum qualitative level of
education. Although education has long been recognized as one of
the most important functions of the state by Americans4 and North
Carolinians,5 compulsory schooling did not gain general acceptance
until the end of the nineteenth century.6 However, Mill's belief that
each child should obtain a certain standard of education has only
1. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 128 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1987).
2. Mill did not endorse state establishment and control of education, but recognized
that government-organized and controlled education, if it existed at all, would force other
educators "up to a certain standard of excellence." Id. at 129.
3. See id. at 128.
4. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,221 (1982) ("We have recognized 'the public
schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of
government,' and as the primary vehicle for transmitting 'the values on which our society
rests.'" (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963); Ambach v.
Norwick, 411 U.S. 68, 76 (1979))); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972)
("Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State."); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("[E]ducation is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments .... [I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education." (citations
omitted)).
5. See, e.g., City of Greensboro v. Hodgin, 106 N.C. 182, 185-86, 11 S.E. 586, 587
(1890) (noting education's prime importance in the state constitution and arguing that
education should be forever encouraged); Lane v. Stanly, 65 N.C. 153, 157 (1871) (finding
education to be a "great governmental consideration" in the first case interpreting the
educational provision of the North Carolina Constitution of 1868); Introduction to 2
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY at viii (Sol Cohen
ed., 1974) (recognizing that North Carolina's public school system was the best in the
antebellum South); Margaret Rose Westbrook, Comment, School Finance Reform Comes
to North Carolina, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2123, 2135 (1995) (noting that North Carolina was
only one of six of the original 13 colonies to include an education article in its first
constitution and was the second state to establish a state public school system).
6. See MARK G. YODOLF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 14 (3d ed.
1992). North Carolina's first compulsory school law was passed in 1923. See Delconte v.
State, 313 N.C. 384, 397-98, 329 S.E.2d 636, 645 (1985) (citing Public Laws 1923, ch. 136
§ 347). For a discussion of the evolution of North Carolina's compulsory school laws, see
id. at 397-99, 329 S.E.2d at 645-46.
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recently begun to manifest itself.7
Because education plays such a vital role in the lives of
Americans, school finance systems that create significant funding
disparities among the various school districts within a state have
come under attack.8 Since the late 1960s, over sixty lawsuits have
been initiated nationwide in efforts to reform state public school
funding schemes.9 In Leandro v. State,10 North Carolina joined the
states that have held that all children are entitled to the same
minimum qualitative level of education, regardless of which schools
the children attend." In Leandro, representatives from poor, rural
school districts and relatively wealthy urban school districts sought
declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that North Carolina and
the North Carolina State Board of Education failed to provide all of
their students with adequate and equal educational opportunities
under the North Carolina Constitution.12 On an appeal from a
dismissal of the school districts' claims, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that the children of North Carolina are entitled to a
"sound basic education" under the North Carolina Constitution. 3
7. See Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third
Wave". From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1153 (1995) (noting that
recent litigation challenging state school systems concentrates on ensuring a certain
minimum quality standard of education). For a discussion on the history of school finance
litigation, see infra notes 122-28.
8. See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform
Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 308 (1991).
9. See Heise, supra note 7, at 1151.
10. 346 N.C. 336,488 S.E.2d 249 (1997).
11. See id. at 350-51, 488 S.E.2d at 255; see also, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 624
So. 2d 107, 110-11 (Ala. 1993) (upholding a lower court ruling that invalidated the school
finance system on both adequacy and equality grounds); Rose v. Council for Better Educ.,
Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212-13 (Ky. 1989) (holding that the state's entire education system
failed to meet both equality and adequacy standards); McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive
Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 553-54 (Mass. 1993) (invalidating school finance system
on adequacy grounds); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 150-52
(Tenn. 1993) (holding that an adequacy standard exists, but failing to define such a
standard and instead invalidating the school finance system on equal protection grounds);
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 585 P.2d 71, 94-95 (Wash. 1978) (en banc)
(holding that the state constitution demands that each child receive a basic education);
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877-78 (W. Va. 1979) (invalidating the school finance
system because the ambitious adequacy standards of the state constitution were violated).
12. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342, 488 S.E.2d at 252; see also N.C. CONST. art. IX,
§ 2(1) (requiring the General Assembly to provide funding and support for "a general and
uniform system of free public schools ... wherein equal opportunities shall be provided
for all students").
13. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255. The supreme court remanded the
case to the trial court to determine if the State is providing a sound, basic education. See
id. at 358, 488 S.E.2d at 261.
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For the first time, the children of North Carolina have a recognized
right to an opportunity to receive an education that will allow them
to become productive citizens. 4 However, the real test of this
constitutional right will be determined on remand, when the trial
court decides whether the children in the plaintiffs' districts are
receiving a sound, basic education.'"
This Note first reviews the facts of Leandro and discusses the
North Carolina Supreme Court's reasoning.' 6 After examining North
Carolina's current school finance system, 7 the Note traces the history
of school finance litigation in the United States.'8 The Note then
examines the supreme court's opinion in Leandro using a three-step
analysis. First, it analyzes the supreme court's finding that the North
Carolina Constitution guarantees a minimum substantive level of
education.' 9 Second, it examines the supreme court's definition of a
"sound basic education" by comparison with similar definitions from
other states granting the right to an adequate education' Third, it
uses a two-step analysis to explore whether a constitutional violation
has occurred by studying the three factors to be used on remand by
the trial court.2 ' The Note concludes with a discussion of the
ramifications of Leandro for the future of education in North
Carolina.'
On May 25, 1994, five boards of education representing poor,
rural North Carolina school districts' joined with twenty individuals
in those districts ("the plaintiffs") and filed suit against the State of
North Carolina and the State Board of Education (collectively "the
State").2 4 On October 17, 1994, the trial court permitted six boards of
education, representing relatively wealthy, urban North Carolina
school districts,' and twelve individuals from those districts ("the
14. See id. at 345, 488 S.E.2d at 254.
15. See id. at 355, 488 S.E.2d at 259.
16. See infra notes 23-105 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 122-38 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 142-59 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 160-81 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 182-260 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 261-77 and accompanying text.
23. The poor school districts were Cumberland, Halifax, Hoke, Robeson, and Vance
Counties. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342,488 S.E.2d at 252.
24. See Leandro v. State, 122 N.C. App. 1, 3,468 S.E.2d 543, 546 (1996), rev'd in part
and aff'd in part, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997). The suit was filed in Halifax
County. See id.
25. The urban school districts were those in Buncombe, Durham, Forsyth,
Mecklenburg, and Wake Counties and the City of Asheville. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at
342, 488 S.E.2d at 252.
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plaintiff-intervenors") to intervene in the suit.26
The rural and urban districts (collectively referred to as "the
plaintiff-parties") contended that the North Carolina Constitution
guarantees two educational rights.27 First, the plaintiff-parties alleged
that all North Carolina children are entitled to an adequate
education. 8 This claim posited that every child is guaranteed the
opportunity to receive a certain minimum qualitative level of
education.29 Second, the plaintiff-parties alleged that all North
Carolina children are entitled to "equal educational opportunities. '"30
The equal opportunities claim is based on the theory that each child
should receive substantially the same level of funding and
educational opportunities.31 Both rural and urban districts claimed
that the State had denied them these rights under the current state
educational system. 3z
As a result of the vastly disparate value of taxable property
26. See Leandro, 122 N.C. App. at 3-4, 468 S.E.2d at 546.
27. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342, 488 S.E.2d at 252. Specifically, the plaintiff-parties
relied on Article I, § 15 and Article IX, § 2 of the North Carolina Constitution. See id. at
345, 488 S.E.2d at 254; see also N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15 (providing that North Carolinians
have a right to education and the State must guard and maintain that right); id. art. IX, § 2
(providing that the state shall provide a free system of public schools). The plaintiff-
parties also alleged statutory violations under Chapter 115C of the North Carolina
General Statutes. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 353, 488 S.E.2d at 258; see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. ch. 115C (1997) (providing the statutory scheme for elementary and secondary
education in North Carolina). Specifically, the plaintiff-parties alleged that the State
violated:
(1) that part of N.C.G.S. § 115C-1 requiring a "general and uniform system of
free public schools... throughout the State, wherein equal opportunities shall be
provided for all students"; (2) that part of N.C.G.S. § 115C-81(al) requiring that
the state provide "every student in the State equal access to a Basic Education
Program"; (3) that part of N.C.G.S. § 115C-122(3) requiring the state to
"prevent denial of equal educational ... opportunity on the basis of ...
economic status.., in the provision of services to any child"; and (4) that part of
N.C.G.S. § 115C-408(b) requiring that the state "assure that the necessary
resources are provided ... from State revenue sources [for] the instructional
expenses for current operations of the public school system as defined in the
standard course of study."
Leandro, 346 N.C. at 353-54, 488 S.E.2d at 258-59 (alterations in original) (quoting N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-1, -81, -122(3), -408(b)). However, the supreme court "found it
unnecessary to dwell at length on these arguments by plaintiff-parties, as ... the statutes
they rely upon do little more than codify a fundamental right guaranteed by our
Constitution." Id. at 353, 488 S.E.2d at 258. Thus, this Note does not discuss these claims
in depth.
28. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342,488 S.E.2d at 252.
29. See id. at 344,488 S.E.2d at 254.
30. Id. at 342, 488 S.E.2d at 252.
31. See id. at 348,488 S.E.2d at 255.
32. See id. at 342,488 S.E.2d at 252.
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between the rural and urban school districts, the claims of these
districts were fundamentally different. Because of low property
values prevalent in rural areas, the rural districts claimed that they
were unable to meet the funding burden imposed upon them under
the state's current funding system.3 3 The rural districts alleged that
the state funding scheme requires local governments to provide
funding for most of the districts' capital expenditures and for twenty-
five percent of current school expenses.3M Despite local tax rates that
are often higher than those of many wealthy districts, as well as
supplemental funding from the state,35 the rural districts alleged that
they could not raise sufficient funds to provide a constitutionally
adequate education.36  The poor districts complained that their
33. See id The basic statutory source of school funding is the ad valorem property
tax. See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 46, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520). In this
sense, the term "poor" refers to counties or school districts where the value of taxable
property is low. See PUBLIC SCH. FORUM OF N.C., NORTH CAROLINA LOCAL SCHOOL
FINANCE STUDY 1994, at 20 (1994) [hereinafter LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY]. Thus,
even with high property tax rates, which are set by individual counties, "poor" counties
receive a lower yield of tax revenue. See id. In 1994, the plaintiff-intervenors' urban
counties had an average property tax base of' $386,007 per student, and the rural
plaintiffs' counties had an average property tax base of $148,209. See id Many poor
counties are approaching the upper limit of property tax rates, and one study has
suggested that the state supplement low-wealth counties' revenues to meet state-
mandated expenditures. See PUBLIC SCH. FORUM OF N.C., ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM:
BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR EDUCATIONAL AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 16-17 (1990)
[hereinafter ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM].
34. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342, 488 S.E.2d at 252 (noting the plaintiffs' allegation
that the local school districts are responsible for 25% of current school expenses); NORTH
CAROLINA DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SCHOOLS
STATISTICAL PROFILE 1997, at 49 (1997) [hereinafter STATISTICAL PROFILE 1997]
(noting that local school districts pay 23.1% of total expenses); Westbrook, supra note 5,
at 2138 (noting that local governments are responsible for approximately 25% of school
expenditures). For a detailed discussion on the statutory funding scheme, see infra notes
106-21 and accompanying text.
35. See Act of July 9, 1993, ch. 321, § 138, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 649, 789-94
(providing supplemental funds to low-wealth school districts), amended by Act of July 16,
1994, ch. 769, § 19.32, 1994 N.C. Sess. Laws 751, 865-70; id. § 138.1, at 794-96 (providing
supplemental funds to school districts with enrollment under a certain level), amended by
Act of July 16, 1994, ch. 769, § 19.32, 1994 N.C. Sess. Laws 751, 865-70. In 1993, the
North Carolina General Assembly appropriated supplemental funding to poor and small
school districts to help equalize educational expenditures among the state's school
districts. See LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 33, at 2.
36. In 1994, the 10 poorest counties had an effective tax rate of $0.75 per $100
valuation, while the 10 wealthiest counties had an effective tax rate of $0.52 per $100
valuation. See LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 33, at 5. The state average is
$0.60 per $100 valuation. See id. The disparity in property values between the poor and
wealthy counties can create vast differences in ability to raise revenue for education. For
instance, a one-cent property tax increase generates over $100 of revenue in the
wealthiest county in North Carolina but generates only $11 of revenue in the poorest
county. See id.
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children suffer from "dilapidated school facilities, [a] short supply of
textbooks, and limited curricula, among other things, all leading to
difficulty in attracting and attaining qualified teachers. '37 The rural
districts further alleged that their children were not receiving the
education required under the Basic Education Program.3 8  Finally,
the rural districts argued that a lack of resources resulted in an
inadequate education for their school children, as reflected by their
poor standardized test scores. 9 The rural districts relied on the
disparity in local funding between the wealthy and poor districts to
illustrate their allegations.40
Due to a highly valued property tax base, the urban districts did
not claim that they were unable to raise revenue. 41 Rather, the urban
districts claimed they were unable to sufficiently support the regular
37. Leandro v. State, 122 N.C. App. 1, 4, 468 S.E.2d 543, 546 (1996), rev'd in part and
affd in part, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997). Under the current system, school
districts may use local funds to supplement teacher salaries and hire teachers for
programs not offered by the state. See Charles D. Liner, Financing North Carolina's
Public Schools, ScH. L. BULL., Summer 1987, at 29. However, low property values fail to
provide sufficient funds to hire supplemental teachers. In 1992-93, the five rural counties
involved in the suit funded, on average, 0.74% of the teachers locally as opposed to a
state average of 5.2%. See LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 33, at 3.
38. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342,488 S.E.2d at 252. The Basic Education Program is
the state education program intended to define and fund a comprehensive educational
program for North Carolina students. For an in-depth discussion of the Basic Education
Program, see infra notes 111-14, 190-92 and accompanying text.
39. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 343, 488 S.E.2d at 252. These districts submitted
evidence that the majority of their students were failing end-of-grade examinations and
that these students performed well below the average Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT")
score. See id. at 342, 488 S.E.2d at 252; Leandro, 122 N.C. App. at 4, 468 S.E.2d at 546. In
1994,37.3% of students statewide performed at or above the proficient level on the end-
of-grade tests for the core courses in high school. See STATE BD. OF EDUC., 1994
REPORT CARD: THE STATE OF SCHOOL SYSTEMS IN NORTH CAROLINA 5 (1995)
[hereinafter REPORT CARD]. Only 19.2% of students were at or above the proficient
level in the rural school districts. See id. at 75, 111, 125, 193, 227. Even more dramatic
are the results from Halifax County in 1993, reporting the following failure rates in the
end-of-course proficiency exams: 79% in physical science, 90% in biology, 86% in
chemistry, 79% in physics, 88% in algebra I, 82% in geometry, 90% in algebra II, 83% in
economic, legal, and political systems, 89% in U.S. history, and 82% in English I. See
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 76, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520). In 1994, the average
SAT score for all North Carolina students was 835 out of a possible 1600. See REPORT
CARD, supra, at 6. The average SAT score in the rural districts was 765.6. See id. at 76,
112, 126, 194,228.
40. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 352, 488 S.E.2d at 258. The gap in local per-pupil
funding has increased in the recent past, and the supplemental funds provided by the state
to small and poor districts is only slowing down the growing disparity. See LOCAL
SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 33, at 4-5. A 1994 study found the gap between the
counties with the highest and lowest local funding to be $1943 per pupil, or a $971,500
difference in a school of 500 children. See id. at 2.
41. See supra notes 33-36.
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education programs with local revenues because the funds were
necessarily diverted to three costs especially associated with urban
areas.42 First, the urban districts claimed that they serve "a large
number of students who require special education services, special
English instruction, and academically gifted programs. 43 Second, the
urban districts maintained that their school facilities were inadequate
due to the enormous growth in North Carolina's urban student
population.44 Third, the urban districts claimed that the state failed
to account for the high costs associated with "municipal
overburden."'4 The theory of municipal overburden maintains that a
disproportionate share of urban tax receipts must be allocated to
other needs acutely present in urban areas, such as "high levels of
poverty, homelessness, crime, unmet health care needs, and
unemployment. 46
The urban districts also asserted that test scores, particularly
those of economically at-risk students, reflected the inadequate
education their students were receiving.' The urban districts did not
submit any test scores to the court to substantiate these claims,
48
probably because those claims focused on the test results of
particular schools rather than the entire district.49
42. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 343,488 S.E.2d at 252.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 343, 488 S.E.2d at 253; see also LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supra
note 33, at 7 (recognizing that several wealthy counties are "severely pressed to keep up
with the building facility demands placed on them by an exploding student population");
Charles D. Liner, Update: School Enrollment Projections, SCH. L. BULL., Winter 1997, at
10-12 (projecting the increase in average daily enrollment in the decade from 1995 to
2005 in the six urban districts to be 16.1%, and projecting the increase for the five rural
districts to be 6.38%).
45. Leandro v. State, 122 N.C. App. 1, 5, 468 S.E.2d 543, 547 (1996), rev'd in part and
affd in part, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997).
46. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 344,488 S.E.2d at 253.
47. See Intervening Complaint at 142, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520). The urban
districts' complaint noted that "approximately 64 schools in the urban school districts had
greater than 50% of their students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches" and that in
"approximately 22 of those 64 schools, the percentage of such poor students is at least
80%." Id. 55.
48. The urban districts did submit reports showing that less than 60% of their high
school graduates completed the minimum courses required for admission to the
University of North Carolina system in 1993. See id. 48. However, this statistic is not
very remarkable in light of the fact that the state average for high school graduates
completing the required courses was 48.5% in 1994. See REPORT CARD, supra note 39, at
6.
49. See Intervening Complaint at 55-56, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520) (noting that
the urban districts have a high concentration of poor schools and finding that the children
in those schools generally perform very poorly on standardized tests); Plaintiff-
Intervenor-Appellants' New Brief at 29-30, Leandro (No. 179-PA-96) (noting that poor
1998] 1487
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The urban districts also alleged that the state supplemental funds
allocated to poor and small school districts denied the children in
urban districts equal protection of the laws under the North Carolina
Constitution.50 The urban districts claimed that the supplemental
state funding, earmarked only for poor and small school districts, was
arbitrary and capricious because the legislature established those
programs without regard for the actual needs of other school
districts.'
In response to the allegations of the plaintiff-parties, the State
moved to dismiss, asserting that the plaintiff-parties failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.52 The State contended that
the claim for adequate educational opportunities was unfounded
because "the Constitution is silent on the issue of 'adequate
education[]' and ... [provides] no such constitutional right. '53 The
State interpreted the constitutional silence as leaving all
determinations of adequacy to the legislature.5 4
After reviewing the parties' positions, the trial court denied the
State's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter and personal
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. 5 The State filed a timely notice of appeal to the North
Carolina Court of Appeals, after which the parties filed a joint
petition to the North Carolina Supreme Court for discretionary
review prior to a determination by the court of appeals. 6 Following a
denial by the supreme court,57 the State filed an alternative petition
for writ of certiorari with the court of appeals, which was allowed.5 8
Reversing the trial court, the court of appeals held that the lawsuit
should be dismissed on the grounds that "the [fundamental] right to
education guaranteed by the North Carolina Constitution is limited
or at-risk students require extra attention to receive an adequate education).
50. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 352, 488 S.E.2d at 258; see also N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 19
(guaranteeing every person equal protection of the laws).
51. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 353-54,488 S.E.2d at 258.
52. See Leandro v. State, 122 N.C. App. 1, 5, 468 S.E.2d 543,547 (1996), rev'd in part
and affd in part, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997). The State also claimed that Halifax
County was an improper venue for an action against public officers. See Leandro, 346
N.C. at 341-42, 488 S.E.2d at 251. The trial court granted the State's petition for transfer
of venue and ordered the suit moved to Wake County because Wake County was the only
proper venue for an action against public officers. See id. at 341-42, 488 S.E.2d at 251-52.
53. Leandro, 122 N.C. App. at 11, 468 S.E.2d at 550.
54. See New Brief for Defendants at 18, Leandro (No. 179-PA-96).
55. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 344, 488 S.E.2d at 253. The motion to dismiss was
denied on January 10, 1995. See Leandro, 122 N.C. App. at 5, 468 S.E.2d at 547.
56. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 344,488 S.E.2d at 253.
57. See Leandro v. State, 455 S.E.2d 662 (N.C. 1995).
58. See Leandro, 122 N.C. App. at 5,468 S.E.2d at 547.
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to one of equal access to ... education, and [it] does not embrace a
qualitative standard. '59 The plaintiff-parties once again petitioned
the North Carolina Supreme Court for discretionary review,' and the
supreme court allowed those petitions.61
After determining that the case raised justiciable questions,6'
Chief Justice Mitchell, writing for the majority of the court,
proceeded to analyze the plaintiff-parties' adequacy claims.63 The
supreme court began by identifying two provisions of the North
Carolina Constitution that could be interpreted as recognizing such a
right.64 Article I, § 15 provides: "The people have a right to the
privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and
maintain that right. ' 65  Article IX, § 2 provides: "The General
Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and
uniform system of free public schools, which shall be maintained at
least nine months in every year, and wherein equal opportunities
shall be provided for all students.166
Reversing the court of appeals, the court held that these
constitutional provisions guarantee every child in North Carolina the
opportunity to receive what it called "a sound basic education."'67
59. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 344, 468 S.E.2d at 253 (citing Britt v. North Carolina State
Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432 (1987)). The court of appeals found the
plaintiff-parties' claims to be indistinguishable from the claims in Britt. See id. The
plaintiffs in Britt challenged the educational finance system on an equal educational
opportunity theory, but the court concluded that the constitutional provisions requiring
equal opportunities only guaranteed "equal access to our public schools-that is, every
child has a fundamental right to [receive] an education in our public schools." Britt, 86
N.C. App. at 283, 289, 357 S.E.2d at 432-33, 436 (citing Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of
Educ., 299 N.C. 609,264 S.E.2d 106 (1980)).
60. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 344,468 S.E.2d at 253.
61. See Leandro v. State, 343 N.C. 512, 472 S.E.2d 11, 12, 13, 15 (1996) (granting the
State's, the plaintiffs', and the plaintiff-intervenors' petitions for review).
62. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 344-45, 488 S.E.2d at 253-54. In its original motion to
dismiss, the State alternatively argued that the plaintiff-parties' claims were
"nonjusticiable political questions." See Leandro, 122 N.C. App. at 12, 468 S.E.2d at 550.
The court of appeals never reached this question. See id. at 11-12, 468 S.E.2d at 550-51.
Thus, the State contended that this "threshold question" should be addressed. See
Leandro, 346 N.C. at 345, 488 S.E.2d at 253-54. The supreme court disposed of this claim
by finding a judicial duty to determine whether the State's actions exceeded constitutional
limits. See id. (citing Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 716, 467 S.E.2d
615, 620 (1996)).
63. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 345,488 S.E.2d at 254.
64. See id.
65. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15.
66. Id. art. IX, § 2(1).
67. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255. The court was careful to distinguish
between the opportunity to receive an adequate education and the actual receipt of an
adequate education, and to limit the right to the former. See id at 350, 488 S.E.2d at 257.
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The court found that "[a]n education that does not serve the purpose
of preparing students to participate and compete in the society in
which they live and work is devoid of substance and is
constitutionally inadequate."'  The court drew support for this
conclusion from judicial and legislative sources. In addition to
reciting corroborating language from an earlier case finding that the
" 'constitutional provisions were intended to establish a system of
public education adequate to the needs of a great and progressive
people,' "69 the court quoted recent statutory language that seemed to
recognize a right to an adequate education. 71
The court also found that the urban districts made sufficient
allegations to challenge, as arbitrary and capricious, the state's
supplemental funding system, which earmarks additional funds
strictly for poor and small school districts.71 The court held that the
legislature has a duty to distribute supplemental funds in a manner
reasonably related to providing an opportunity for a sound, basic
The court recognized that "[s]ubstantial problems have been experienced in those states
in which the courts have held that the state constitution guaranteed the right to [receive] a
sound basic education." Id. (emphasis added) (citing various state court decisions and
multiple articles). The court found that granting the right to an adequate education was
an "impractical and unattainable goal." Id. (noting the difficulty Connecticut, Texas, and
West Virginia had in interpreting court mandates to restructure school finance systems
and implementing new school finance schemes).
68. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 345,488 S.E.2d at 254.
69. Id. at 346, 488 S.E.2d at 254 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Board of Comm'rs, 174
N.C. 469,472,93 S.E. 1001, 1002 (1917) (emphasis in original)).
70. See id at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 254-55. The supreme court quoted the following
language from a statute governing the use of state education funds:
"(a) It is the policy of the State of North Carolina to create a public school
system that graduates good citizens with the skills demanded in the marketplace,
and the skills necessary to cope with contemporary society, using State, local and
other funds in the most cost-effective manner....
(b) To insure a quality education for every child in North Carolina, and to assure
that the necessary resources are provided, it is the policy of the State of North
Carolina to provide from State revenue sources the instructional expenses for
current operations of the public school system as defined in the standard course
of study."
Id (alteration in original) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-408 (1994)). The court also
cited statutory language stating that local boards of education have a duty " 'to provide
adequate school systems within their respective local school administrative units, as
directed by law.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-47(1)
(1997)).
71. See id. at 353, 488 S.E.2d at 258. The urban districts did not argue that the State
had no right to distribute additional funds; instead, they argued that the State's scheme
for supplemental funding was "arbitrar[y] and without regard for the actual supplemental
educational needs of particular school districts throughout the state." Id. at 352-53, 488
S.E.2d at 258.
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education.72 A failure to meet this duty "could result in a denial of
equal protection or due process."'73
The supreme court then addressed the plaintiff-parties' claims
that the equal opportunity clause in Article IX, § 2(1) of the North
Carolina Constitution requires equal educational opportunitieg.74
Although Article IX, § 2(1) requires a "general and uniform system
... wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students,"
the court held that this language does not require substantially equal
funding in every school district.75 The court relied upon three
grounds to uphold the current method of state funding for the public
schools.76 First, because the constitution expressly provides that local
school districts may supplement state education funds,77 the court
concluded that the framers could not have intended that the
72. See id at 353, 488 S.E.2d at 258.
73. Id. Because the trial court will review this claim under an equal opportunity
analysis rather than an adequacy analysis, this claim will not be discussed further.
However, a cursory look at this claim reveals serious weaknesses in the urban districts'
claims. Many of these alleged urban costs are already compensated for under the current
school finance system. For example, the State provides funds for special education to
which handicapped children are entitled. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-110 (1997)
(distributing responsibility for funding between the state and the local educational
agencies). The State also provides funds for gifted children. See Act of July 16, 1994, ch.
769, § 19.5A, 1994 N.C. Sess. Laws 751, 844-45. Furthermore, the General Assembly
recently provided for a $1.8 billion dollar bond for school facilities, of which 45% is
allocated to school districts based on student population growth projections. See Act of
June 21, 1996, ch. 631, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 182; Laurie L. Mesibov, 1996 North Carolina
Legislation Pertaining to Elementary and Secondary Education, SCH. L. BULL., Fall 1996,
at 12. Moreover, the matching county welfare payments mandated by the State may have
a greater impact on the poor, rural districts than on the urban districts. See LOCAL
SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 33, at 5-6 (noting that Hoke County, one of the
plaintiff rural districts, spends over 30% of its entire budget on mandated welfare
payments, while Mecklenburg County, one of the urban plaintiff-intervenors, spends less
than seven percent of its budget on these payments). The supreme court noted the irony
of allowing the relatively wealthy districts to benefit from the Supplemental Fund. See
Leandro, 346 N.C. at 351-52, 488 S.E.2d at 257. Therefore, the trial court will likely be
reluctant to grant supplemental funds to these urban districts because the funds would
increase the funding gap. See id. ("Ironically, if plaintiff-intervenors' argument should
prevail, they would be entitled to an unequally large per-pupil allocation of state school
funds for their relatively wealthy urban districts.").
74. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 348, 488 S.E.2d at 255. Although the plaintiff-parties'
equality claims formed a major part of their action, this Note limits its discussion of the
equality issues to summarizing the opinion of the supreme court. It is beyond the scope of
this Note to analyze the equality claims because they will have no bearing on remand. See
id. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261 (defining the issues for the trial court on remand).
75. Id. at 349,488 S.E.2d at 256.
76. See id. at 358,488 S.E.2d at 261 (Orr, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
77. See N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(2) ("The governing boards of units of local
government with financial responsibility for public education may use local revenues to
add to or supplement any public school or post-secondary school program.").
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inequities resulting from local funding would be unconstitutional. 78
Second, the court found that counties have a long history of funding
local school districts.79  Third, the court noted that, due to the
difficulty inherent in defining equality, granting the right to
substantially equal educational opportunities would lead to a "steady
stream of litigation" that would, ironically, deplete the resources of
the educational system and the courts.80
The court next examined the plaintiff-parties' argument that
North Carolina's education statutes afforded children a right to equal
educational opportunities.8' However, the supreme court found it
unnecessary to analyze the plaintiff-parties' statutory arguments in
detail, finding that the statutes were a mere codification of the
educational rights found in the constitution. 82 Thus, the court held
that none of the statutes required equal educational opportunities
because the constitution fails to recognize that right.8 3 Because the
constitution does grant the right to an adequate education, the court
found that the plaintiff-parties were entitled to a trial to produce
evidence that the State has committed violations of chapter 115C of
the General Statutes and that those violations have prevented the
children in the plaintiff-parties' districts the opportunity to receive a
sound, basic education.'
Having concluded that the plaintiff-parties' only valid claims
were those related to an adequate education, the supreme court
proceeded to clarify the constitutional right to an adequate education
by defining a "sound basic education"8 5 Under the North Carolina
Constitution, all children of the state are entitled to the opportunity
78. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 349-50, 488 S.E.2d at 256 (relying on Britt v. State Board
of Education, 86 N.C. App. 282, 288, 357 S.E.2d 432, 435-36 (1987), for the proposition
that this provision precludes an interpretation that the constitution requires that equal
educational opportunities be offered).
79. See id. at 349, 488 S.E.2d at 256. The court cited the following language for
support: "'The Constitution plainly contemplates and intends that the several counties,
as such, shall bear a material part of the burden of supplying such funds.'" Id. (quoting
City of Greensboro v. Hodgin, 106 N.C. 182, 187-88, 11 S.E. 586, 588 (1890)).
80. See id at 350, 488 S.E.2d at 257. If the right to substantially equal educational
opportunities were granted, the court noted that "no matter how much money was spent
on the schools of the state, at any given time some of those districts would be out of
compliance." Id. at 350, 488 S.E.2d at 256-57.
81. See id. at 353-54,488 S.E.2d at 258-59.
82. See id. at 353, 488 S.E.2d at 258.
83. See id. at 354, 488 S.E.2d at 259.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255. A "sound basic education" is the term, created
by the court, to define the qualitative level of education required by the North Carolina
Constitution. See id. No prior decision has delineated these rights.
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to develop the following four skills: (1) sufficient ability to read,
write, and speak English and a fundamental knowledge of
mathematics and physical science; (2) a fundamental knowledge of
geography, history, and basic economic and political systems; (3)
sufficient skills to enable students to engage successfully in further
education or vocational training; and (4) sufficient skills to allow
students to compete equally with others in further education or
employment.86
The court announced that definition "with some trepidation"
because it recognized that judges are not education experts and are
not well-suited to identify those curricula best designed to provide a
sound, basic education.7 The court determined that the legislature,
which can consider the views of the public and educational experts, is
a superior forum to ensure that each child has the opportunity to
receive an adequate education.s Moreover, the court acknowledged
that the determination of the educational system that will best
provide the opportunity for a sound, basic education is initially the
province of the legislative and executive branches.89
The court's deference to the legislature influenced the
framework it established for the trial court's analysis on remand. The
supreme court determined that the judicial branch "must grant every
reasonable deference to the legislative and executive branches when
considering whether they have established and are administering a
system that provides the children ... a sound basic education." 90 If
the trial court is convinced by a clear showing that the State is
denying children a sound, basic education, a denial of a fundamental
86. See id. (citing Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky.
1989); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979)). The court's full definition of a
sound, basic education was:
(1) sufficient ability to read, write, and speak the English language and a
sufficient knowledge of fundamental mathematics and physical science to enable
the student to function in a complex and rapidly changing society; (2) sufficient
fundamental knowledge of geography, history, and basic economic and political
systems to enable the student to make informed choices with regard to issues
that affect the student personally or affect the student's community, state, and
nation; (3) sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable the student to
successfully engage in post-secondary education or vocational training; and (4)
sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable the student to compete on an
equal basis with others in further formal education or gainful employment in
contemporary society.
Id.
87. See id. at 354,488 S.E.2d at 259.
88. See id. at 354-55,488 S.E.2d at 259.
89. See id. at 357,488 S.E.2d at 261.
90. Id.
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right will have been established and the trial court must apply strict
scrutiny.91 Thus, the State may still extricate itself from liability by
proving that the denial of this fundamental right is "'necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest.' "91 If the State fails to
prove that it has a compelling interest, the court has a duty to enter a
judgment granting relief sufficient to correct the wrong while
minimizing interference with other branches of government.93
In order to aid the trial court, the supreme court delineated
three factors to be used in determining whether children have
received a sound, basic education: (1) "educational goals and
standards adopted by the legislature"; (2) "the level of performance
... on standard achievement tests"; and (3) "the level of the state's
general educational expenditures and per-pupil expenditures. '" 94
However, the court made it clear that these factors are neither
dispositive nor exclusive.9'
The supreme court included several caveats on utilizing
standardized tests and state educational expenditures as factors. The
court cautioned that standardized tests are still the "subject of much
debate. ' 96 Despite this controversy, the supreme court seemed to
favor the use of standardized tests by stating that "such 'output'
measurements may be more reliable than measurements of 'input'
such as per-pupil funding or general educational funding provided by
the state." 97 The court had clear misgivings about the correlation of
educational expenditures and the quality of education.98
Nonetheless, although it noted that" 'substantial increases in funding
91. See id.
92. Id. (quoting Town of Beech Mountain v. County of Watauga, 324 N.C. 409, 412,
378 S.E.2d 780,782 (1989)).
93. See iL (citing Corum v. University of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 784, 413 S.E.2d 276, 291
(1992)).
94. Id at 355-57,488 S.E.2d at 259-60.
95. See id. (noting that legislative goals are not determinative, that standardized tests
are not absolutely authoritative, and that educational funding is not the sole factor for
determining educational adequacy). Additionally, the court made it clear that other
factors may be used in the determination on remand. See id. at 357,488 S.E.2d at 260.
96. Ia. at 355,488 S.E.2d at 260.
97. Id. (citing McUsic, supra note 8, at 329).
98. The court recognized that" 'one of the major sources of controversy concerns the
extent to which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures and
the quality of education.'" Id. at 356, 488 S.E.2d at 260 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973)); see also id. (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515
U.S. 70, 70 (1995), in which the Supreme Court recognized that students in the Kansas
City schools had very high funding levels that provided unparalleled opportunities but
that the "learner outcomes" of the students remained at or below national norms).
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produce only modest gains,' "99 the court concludedthat the level of
funding may have, enough impact to warrant consideration when
determining whether a violation has occurred.'
In the lone dissent, Justice Orr disagreed with the majority's
denial of the right to equal educational opportunities.'' Justice Orr
argued that, under the constitution, the ultimate responsibility
resided with the State to "'guard and maintain' " the right to an
adequate education by providing sufficient funding."° Justice Orr
contended that the constitutional provisions allowing local
governments to supplement state funding did not diminish the State's
responsibility, where poor counties "simply cannot tax themselves to
a level of educational quality that its tax base cannot supply."'0 3 In
response to the potential stream of litigation, Justice Orr found that
the majority misinterpreted the equal opportunities clause as
requiring strict equality rather than substantial equality which, he
argued, would not result in increased litigation."°  Justice Orr
contended that the fundamental issue was the substantial equality of
educational opportunities, not simply the equality of funding.0
In order to understand the claims in Leandro fully, it is necessary
to examine North Carolina's statutory scheme of educational
funding. While most states rely primarily on local governments to
raise educational funds, North Carolina's school finance system
places most of the funding burden on the state. 6 In North Carolina,
the State directly provides the primary funding for the costs of
operating the public school system, whereas the counties are
primarily responsible for the construction of school buildings and
99. Id. (quoting William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions Posed by
Rodriguez: Ending the Separation of School Finance and Educational Policy by Bridging
the Gap Between Wrong and Remedy, 24 CoNN. L. REv. 721, 726 (1992)). Additionally,
the court would not have listed educational expenditures as a factor if it determined that
there was no correlation between funding and the quality of education. See id. at 355-57,
488 S.E.2d at 260 (listing the State's educational expenditures as a factor in determining
whether the State is providing an adequate education).
100. See id. at 355,488 S.E.2d at 260.
101. See id. at 358,488 S.E.2d at 261 (Orr, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Justice Orr did agree with the majority's granting of the right to an adequate education.
See id. at 364, 488 S.E.2d at 265 (Orr, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
102. Id. at 358, 488 S.E.2d at 261 (Orr, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(quoting N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15).
103. Id. at 359,488 S.E.2d at 262 (Orr, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
104. See id. at 360-61, 488 S.E.2d at 263 (Orr, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
105. See id. (Orr, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
106. See Liner, supra note 37, at 37.
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other capital expenditures.'07 However, the state's current education
funding is insufficient to cover all the operating costs; thus, local
funding provides for approximately twenty-five percent of
educational expenses.' ° Additionally, the local governments are
responsible for about ninety-five percent of all capital
expenditures. 1 9 This reliance on local governments to supplement
state support has led to wide funding disparities between wealthy and
poor school districts."0
In North Carolina, the majority of state education funds are
allocated on roughly a per-student basis under the Basic Education
Program (the "BEP")."' By utilizing state funds, the BEP was
intended to provide all North Carolina students a comprehensive
educational program, regardless of a school district's ability to raise
local funds." However, the State has never fully funded the BEP.1"
Additionally, any education costs outside the scope of the BEP must
be funded from alternate sources, usually local governments. 4
Because the BEP distribution plan fails to account for a district's
ability to fund its schools adequately, the legislature has sought to
107. See New Brief for Defendants at 7, Leandro (No. 179-PA-96).
108. See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 44, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520) (citation
omitted); Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2138-39.
109. See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 44, Leandro (No. 94-CVS 520).
110. See LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 33, at 2. In 1994, the difference
between the highest and lowest districts in local per-pupil expenditures was $2410 to $467,
or $1943. See id. Similar disparities in local expenditures have resulted in constitutional
violations in other states. The gap in per-pupil revenues in Alabama in 1989-90 was
$2449. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 115 (Ala. 1993) (rendering an advisory
opinion that the state legislature was required to comply with a circuit court order to
provide substantially equitable and adequate educational opportunities). The gap in
Arkansas was $1505. See Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Ark.
1983). The gap in funds per pupil in Tennessee in the 1987 school year was $1846. See
Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 145 (Tenn. 1993).
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81 (1997); see also Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2137
(noting that the BEP was enacted to increase state education funding and better define
the state's obligation to finance education).
112. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2137. For a more detailed discussion of the
BEP's curriculum, see infra note 190-92 and accompanying text.
113. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342, 488 S.E.2d at 252 (noting the plaintiffs' allegations
to this effect). According to the statute, "[i]t is the goal of the General Assembly that the
Basic Education Program be fully funded and completely operational in each local
administrative unit by July 1, 1995." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81(a). As of 1994, the BEP
was underfunded by about $333 million. See LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supra
note 33, at 2.
114. See ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra note 33, at 8 (recognizing that if a
community wishes to offer a course outside the scope of the BEP, such as calculus, that
community will have to pay for it). Local governments may use local funds to supplement
teachers' salaries or to provide personnel beyond that provided by the state. See Liner,
supra note 37, at 29.
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provide supplemental funds to low-wealth counties in order to enable
those counties to enhance educational programs and student
performance. The State's effort to equalize funding has taken two
major forms. In 1993, the legislature enacted a statute providing
supplemental funding to small and low-wealth school districts."6
Nevertheless, the funds appropriated have not been sufficient to
reduce the widening disparities between poor and wealthy school
districts."7 In 1996, the legislature passed the Public School Building
Bond Act of 1996 (the "Bond Act"),"8 which authorized the issuance
of a $1.8 billion bond for funding new construction of school
buildings, the renovation of existing school buildings, and the
purchase of equipment for school buildings." 9 The Bond Act
reserves thirty-five percent of these bond funds for counties that are
least able to provide adequate funding for their schools. Although
insufficient, these steps evidenced the legislature's intent to close the
educational gap.12
1
North Carolina is not the first state to struggle with school
finance litigation. Numerous other states have undergone similar
litigation, and their experiences shed light on the claims raised in
115. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81(a).
116. See Act of July 9, 1993, ch. 321, § 138, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 649, 789-94
(providing supplemental funds to low-wealth school districts), amended by Act of July 16,
1994, ch. 769, § 19.32, 1994 N.C. Sess. Laws 751, 865-70; id. § 138.1, at 794-96 (providing
supplemental funds to school districts with enrollment under a certain level), amended by
Act of July 16, 1994, ch. 769, § 19.32, 1994 N.C. Sess. Laws 751, 865-70.
117. In 1995, $46.5 million was appropriated for low-wealth counties, and $538,000 was
appropriated for small school systems. See Mesibov, supra note 73, at 2. "While the
supplemental funds ... have slowed the increase in the gap, there continues to be a
growing disparity between the amount of funding support available to schools." LOCAL
SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 33, at 5. In the 1992-93 school year, the year before
the General Assembly enacted supplemental funding, the difference between the ten
school districts with the highest total per-pupil expenditure and the ten school districts
with the lowest per-pupil expenditure was $1,543.92. See NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF
PUB. INSTRUCTION, PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF NORTH CAROLINA STATISTICAL PROFILE
1994, at 54-56 (1994) [hereinafter STATISTICAL PROFILE 1994] (excluding child nutrition
funds). In the 1995-96 school year, the difference between the ten school districts with
the highest total per-pupil expenditure and the ten school districts with the lowest per-
pupil expenditure had increased to $1,966.06. See STATISTICAL PROFILE 1997, supra note
34, at 54-56 (excluding child nutrition funds). In the 1995-96 school year, the difference
between the school districts with the highest and the lowest total per-pupil funding was
$3,697.42. See id. at 55.
118. Act of June 21, 1996, ch. 631,1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 182.
119. See Mesibov, supra note 73, at 12.
120. See id.
121. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81(a) (1997) (stating that a goal of supplemental
funding was "to allow those counties to enhance the instructional program and student
achievement").
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Leandro. Judicial intervention in public school financing has
undergone three phases."2  In the late 1960s, the first wave of
lawsuits challenged school funding discrepancies between poor and
rich school districts on the theory that they violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.1' 3  In San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,"' the United
States Supreme Court effectively closed the door to federal actions
based on equal educational opportunity and, consequently, ended the
first wave of litigation.'25 The Rodriguez Court concluded that
education was not a protected fundamental right under the United
States Constitution and found that Texas's school finance system
satisfied a rational relation test despite dramatic funding disparities
between rich and poor school districts. 26
Cases in the second wave remained focused on challenging the
financial discrepancies or the school finance systems on equal
educational opportunity grounds, but the plaintiffs shifted their
attack to state constitutions. 27 Unlike the Federal Constitution,
122. William Thro suggested classifying school finance litigation into this framework.
See William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas
Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219,
222 (1990). Commentators have generally accepted this framework. See, e.g., Gail F.
Levine, Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative Approaches to Recent Judicial School
Finance Rulings, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 507, 507-08 (1991); William F. Dietz, Note,
Manageable Adequacy Standards in Education Reform Litigation, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1193,
1194 n.5 (1996).
123. See Heise, supra note 7, at 1153; Frank J. Macchiarola & Joseph G. Diaz,
Disorder in the Courts: The Aftermath of San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez in the State Courts, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 551, 553 (1996).
124. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
125. See id. at 54-55 (holding that the property-tax based school financing system in
Texas did not require strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because there was
no suspect class and no fundamental right; thus the system, which resulted in per-pupil
spending differences, passed constitutional muster by "rationally further[ing] a legitimate
state purpose or interest"); Heise, supra note 7, at 1156 ("[T]he Rodriguez decision
essentially closed the door to school finance challenges based on the federal Equal
Protection Clause."). There is some support for the contention that the U.S. Constitution
may guarantee an adequate level of education. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285
(1986) ("[T]his Court has not yet definitively settled the questions whether a minimally
adequate education is a fundamental right and whether a statute alleged to
discriminatorily infringe that right should be accorded heightened equal protection
review."); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36 (noting, in dicta, that there may be "some
identifiable quantum of education" guaranteed by the Constitution to ensure a
meaningful exercise of other rights).
126. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36,54-55.
127. See William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance
Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 601-02 (1994).
During the second wave, two states recognized the right to an adequate education. See
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978) (en banc); Pauley v.
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every state constitution mandates that the states provide for public
education.- 8 The second-wave suits concentrated on state equal
protection clauses and, to a smaller degree, state education clauses. 129
These cases, although resulting in some victories for the plaintiffs,1"
were largely unsuccessful. 31 The second wave ended in early 1989.132
The third and current wave shifted the focus from financial
equity under state equal protection clauses to the quality of
education under education clauses of state constitutions. 33 Although
often coupled with equal opportunity claims,"M the third wave's
hallmark is challenging the adequacy of education rather than the
equality of financing. 35 Commentators have noted several political
Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979).
128. See Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State
Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1343-48 (1992) (listing each state's education
clause in an appendix).
129. See Thro, supra note 127, at 601-02.
130. See Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v.
Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 952-53 (Cal. 1976); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374-75 (Conn.
1977); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 296-97 (N.J. 1973); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585
P.2d at 104; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 883-84.
131. See Thro, supra note 127, at 602-03 (citing several unsuccessful second wave
suits).
132. See id. at 601. The second wave is generally considered to have ended with the
adequacy decision in Kentucky. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d
186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
133. See Heise, supra note 7, at 1162.
134. The end of the third wave did not signal the end of all equity claims. In fact,
several state school finance systems have been struck down on equity grounds since 1989.
See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 165 (Ala. 1993) (upholding a lower court
ruling that invalidated the school finance system on both adequacy and equality grounds);
Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 815-16 (Ariz. 1994) (en
banc) (holding that the public school finance structure violated the "general and uniform"
requirement of the education clause due to funding disparities arising from the reliance
on property taxes, and determining that the adequacy claims were not properly before the
court); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215-16 (holding that the state's entire education system failed
to meet both equality and adequacy standards); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Montana, 769 P.2d 684, 693 (Mont. 1989) (invalidating the school finance system on the
grounds that equal educational opportunities were not provided), modified, 784 P.2d 412
(Mont. 1990) (granting an extension of the effective date of the earlier judgment to allow
the legislative and executive branches additional time to enact a sufficient system of
funding); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 411-12 (N.J. 1990) (invalidating the school
finance system for stark disparities in opportunities between poor urban districts and
wealthy districts, and requiring funding of poor urban schools at levels commensurate
with wealthy districts); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 156
(Tenn. 1993) (holding that an adequate standard exists, but failing to define such a
standard, and instead, invalidating the school finance system on equal protection
grounds); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397-98 (Tex. 1989)
(invalidating school finance system on grounds that substantially equal access to
education funding is required).
135. See Heise, supra note 7, at 1153. For discussions on the shift from equality to
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advantages of adequacy over equality claims, that should result in
greater success for adequacy claims. 3 6 To date, several third-wave
plaintiffs have been successful in their claims,37 while others have
been unsuccessful. 38
This Note will analyze the North Carolina Supreme Court's
rationale for holding that the state constitution guarantees the right
to a minimum qualitative level of education by examining two aspects
of the opinion and foreshadowing the analysis of the trial court on
remand. First, this Note will discuss the supreme court's finding that
the constitution guarantees a minimum level of education.139 Second,
this Note will analyze the supreme court's definition of a sound, basic
adequacy claims, see generally Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in
School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REv. 101 (1995), and Heise, supra note 7.
136. See Heise, supra note 7, at 1174-75 (stating that adequacy "exhibits greater
appeal to widely accepted norms of fairness and opportunity" and "cohere[s] with the
emerging educational standards movement"); McUsic, supra note 8, at 327 (arguing that
adequacy claims are "less likely to disrupt local control of schools, pit the judiciary
against the legislature, or require legislators to enact a funding scheme that thwarts the
interests of their wealthier constituents"); Thro, supra note 127, at 603-04 (asserting that
because the education clause has fewer ramifications on other areas of the law, adequacy
claims are more likely to be successful challenges to school financing systems).
137. See supra note 134; see also McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ.,
615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993) (invalidating school finance system on adequacy
grounds). Leandro falls within this category.
138. See Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d
400, 408 (Fla. 1996) (finding that the plaintiffs had failed to define an appropriate
adequacy standard that would not pose a substantial risk of intruding into the domain of
the legislature); Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 641 N.E.2d 602, 605 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994) (concluding that the plaintiffs claims did not rely "on the adequacy of education in
a district, but on differences in benefits and opportunities offered from district to
district"); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. Kansas, 885 P.2d 1170, 1196-97 (Kan. 1994)
(holding that the school financing system met constitutional requirements by uniform
application throughout the state, despite the disparities that resulted from such an
application); Skeen v. Minnesota, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315 (Minn. 1993) (concluding that the
standards set by the State Board of Education provided an adequate education, even
though the plaintiffs conceded that the State provided an adequate education and made
no adequacy claims); Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 1993) (rejecting adequacy
claims for failure to allege that unequal funding affected the qualitative level of
education); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. North Dakota, 511 N.W.2d 247, 263 (N.D.
1994) (upholding the school finance system on procedural grounds, despite the
constitutionally suspect disparities in funding between districts); Coalition for Equitable
Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Oregon, 811 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Or. 1991) (en banc) (rejecting
equality claims on the grounds that the constitution presupposes use of local revenues);
Scott v. Virginia, 443 S.E.2d 138, 141-43 (Va. 1994) (upholding the school finance system
against equality claims on the grounds that substantial equality of funding or educational
opportunity is not required); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 584-85 (Wis. 1989)
(holding that school finance system was constitutional, even though the system failed to
allocate supplemental funds to poor districts).
139. See infra notes 142-59 and accompanying text.
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education.140  Third, this Note will examine the three factors to be
utilized on remand to determine whether a constitutional violation
has occurred."'
The North Carolina Supreme Court first had to determine
whether the constitution guarantees a minimum qualitative level of
education. Although there is precedent interpreting the North
Carolina Constitution's provision for equal educational
opportunities,142 the plaintiff-parties' adequacy claims were an issue
of first impression." Textually, the North Carolina Constitution is
silent as to whether an individual has a constitutional right to an
adequate education, 144 and consequently some commentators have
asserted that it grants only minimal qualifative rights.1 45
Nevertheless, despite the absence of specific textual language, a
review of the framers' intent suggests that an adequacy standard was
a consideration. 46 In a statement designed to encourage ratification
of the constitution, the framers stated that the constitution was "to
give every child, as far as the State can, an opportunity to develop to
the fullest extent, all his intellectual gifts."'47 The plaintiff-parties in
Leandro encouraged the court to interpret this statement as an intent
to mandate a constitutional right to an adequate education.48 On the
other hand, the State argued that the framers failed to make that
intent explicitly clear in the language; thus, the State urged the court
140. See infra notes 160-81 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 182-260 and accompanying text.
142. See Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282,290,357 S.E.2d
432, 436-37 (1987) (rejecting a claim of equal educational opportunity).
143. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2164 (noting that scholars disagreed as to
whether the North Carolina Constitution granted the right to an adequate education
before the decision in Leandro).
144. See McUsic, supra note 8, at 321; William E. Thro, The Role of Language of the
State Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 23-24 & n.28
(1993); see also N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15 ("The people have a right to the privilege of
education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right."); id. art. IX,
§ 2(1) (requiring the General Assembly to provide funding and support for "a general and
uniform system of free public schools ... wherein equal opportunities shall be provided
for all students"). These provisions clearly guarantee the right to a free public education
but have no language intimating adequacy.
145. See McUsic, supra note 8, at 321 (finding that constitutions granting a "general"
and "uniform" education, like North Carolina's, "express a minimal commitment to
educational quality"); Thro, supra note 144, at 23-24 & n.28 (noting that the language of
North Carolina's constitution requires a minimal level of quality).
146. See JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH
CAROLINA 487 (1868).
147. Id.
148. See Plaintiff-Appellants' New Brief at 10-11, Leandro (No. 179-PA-96); Plaintiff-
Intervenor-Appellants' New Brief at 14, Leandro (No. 179-PA-96).
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to apply the constitutional maxim that all authority not expressly
provided for in a constitution remains with the legislature.'49 The
court resolved this ambiguity by finding that the text of the North
Carolina Constitution itself guarantees the right to a sound, basic
education.15
As the Leandro court recognized, there is support in case law
and statutes for granting the right to an adequate education. The
support upon which the court relied, however, is quite limited.151 In
Board of Education v. Board of Commissioners,52 the North Carolina
Supreme Court stated that "these constitutional provisions were
intended to establish a system of public education adequate to the
needs of a great and progressive people.1' 53 This early judicial
interpretation is bolstered by more recent pronouncements from the
General Assembly, which has adopted language that clearly connotes
the right to an adequate education.15 4
The supreme court's recognition of the right to an adequate
education appeared to be motivated more by the plight of North
Carolina's children and the recent acceptance of adequacy claims in
other states than strong legal precedent in North Carolina law.
Absent this right to an adequate education, the plaintiff-parties
asserted that the State could fulfill its constitutional duties by
providing children with mandatory, tuition-free access to
"warehouses" for nine months a year where no real learning
occurred. 5 5 It was reported that Chief Justice Mitchell, during oral
149. See New Brief for Defendants at 18, Leandro (No. 179-PA-96). Specifically, the
State argued that " '[a]ll power which is not expressly limited by the people in our State
Constitution remains with the people, and an act of the people through their
representatives in the legislature is valid unless prohibited by that Constitution.' " Id.
(quoting State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438,448,385 S.E.2d 473,478 (1989)).
150. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 345,488 S.E.2d at 254.
151. The supreme court cited only one case and two statutes in support, neither of
which speaks directly of a constitutional right. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 346-47, 488
S.E.2d at 254-55; see also Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2164 (noting that scholars disagreed
as to whether the North Carolina Constitution granted the right to an adequate education
before the decision in Leandro).
152. 174 N.C. 469,93 S.E. 1001 (1917).
153. Id. at 472, 93 S.E. at 1002.
154. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81 (1997) (stating, in the BEP, that "the
mission of the public school community is to challenge with high expectations each child
to learn, to achieve, and to fulfill his or her potential"); id. § 115C-12(9b) (directing the
State Board of Education to "implement high school exit exams, grade-level student
proficiency benchmarks, ... and student proficiency benchmarks for the knowledge and
skills necessary to enter the workforce"); supra note 70 (quoting statute governing the use
of state education funds).
155. See Plaintiff-Appellants' New Brief at 13, Leandro (No. 179-PA-96); Plaintiff-
Intervenor-Appellants' New Brief at 10-11, Leandro (No. 179-PA-96).
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testimony, commented to an attorney for the State," 'Shouldn't there
be something at the end of the bus ride?' "156 The supreme court
seemed persuaded by the plaintiff-parties' argument that the
constitution required a meaningful education, as it held that "[a]n
education that does not serve the purpose of preparing students to
participate and compete in the society in which they live and work is
devoid of substance and is constitutionally inadequate." '157
Additionally, recent cases from other states bolstered the force of the
plaintiff-parties' adequacy claims. 58 The supreme court was clearly
aware of this recent trend granting the right to an adequate
education; 59 apparently, the court unanimously believed that
adequacy was a right whose time had come.
Once the supreme court determined that a right to an adequate
education exists, it reached the second step of its analysis: defining
what constitutes a constitutionally adequate education. The
definition of "adequate education" is important because it may
"effectively determine[] the outcome of the litigation.' 60 One
commentator hypothesized that almost all school finance schemes
will be struck down under a high adequacy standard, and in contrast,
school finance systems will almost always pass constitutional muster
under a low adequacy standard.'6' Thus, it is instructive to compare
Leandro's framework of a sound, basic education with those from
other states that have granted this right.
Courts have tended to take one of two basic approaches in
delineating the minimum qualitative level of a constitutionally
required education. First, some courts have taken a "deferential"
approach, granting broad discretion to the legislature. 62 Minnesota 63
156. Steve Ford, A Sound, Basic Step Toward Better Schools, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), July 27, 1997, at A28 (quoting Chief Justice Burley Mitchell).
157. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 345,488 S.E.2d at 254.
158. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993); McDuffy v.
Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Tennessee Small
Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); see also Westbrook, supra note 5,
at 2164 (noting that recent decisions in Massachusetts and Tennessee were based on
weaker constitutional provisions than North Carolina's).
159. In its opinion, the court cited cases from West Virginia and Kentucky granting
similar rights when defining a sound, basic education. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 347, 488
S.E.2d at 255 (citing Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky.
1989); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979)). The court also cited several
law review articles highlighting the adequacy suits in other states. See id. at 355-56, 488
S.E.2d at 259-260 (citing Clune, supra note 99, at 726; McUsic, supra note 8, at 332; Thro,
supra note 127, at 602).
160. Thro, supra note 127, at 607.
161. See id.
162. See Dietz, supra note 122, at 1204 (asserting that courts taking this approach are
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and Rhode Island' 64 have followed this approach. In Minnesota, the
supreme court determined that an adequate level of education is
equal to the minimum standards required by the State Board of
Education. 65 In Rhode Island, the court determined that the
legislature was solely responsible for quantifying the minimum
adequacy standards. 66 States implementing a deferential definition
are considered to have a low standard, 167 and neither the Minnesota
nor the Rhode Island court found a constitutional violation.16
States applying the second approach forcefully guide educational
policy by implementing "wide-ranging and ambitious standards" that
"define the contours of educational adequacy."'69 These definitions
usually emphasize education as the key to individual success and the
importance of education as a basis for our nation's democratic
institutions and economic success. 170 Due to its ambitious nature, this
policy approach is thought to set a high standard for an adequate
education.17 1
Several states have followed this policy approach by delineating
several educational capacities guaranteed by their constitutions. 7 z
either "mindful of the difficulties inherent in adequacy measurement or perhaps fearful of
overstepping the bounds of judicial competence").
163. See Skeen v. Minnesota, 505 N.W.2d 299,315 (Minn. 1993).
164. See City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40,62 (R.I. 1995).
165. See Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 315. Despite the plaintiffs' stipulation that they were
already receiving an adequate education, the Skeen court proceeded to analyze the
plaintiffs' claims under an adequacy standard. See id.; see also Michele M. Hanke, Have
Money, Will Educate: Wealth Versus Equality in the Minnesota School Finance System, 19
HAmUNE L. REv. 135, 144 (1995) ("The court reasoned that, because the state provided
an adequate education, and because no constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right to
any particular funding scheme existed, the legislature was free to craft a system that
achieved the constitutional mandates.").
166. See City of Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 56,58-59.
167. See Thro, supra note 127, at 613 (maintaining that courts which rely on the
legislature or state board of education to define adequacy standards will rarely find a
violation).
168. See Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 315 ("Because the present system provides uniform
funding to each student in the state in an amount sufficient to generate an adequate level
of education which meets all state standards, the state has satisfied its constitutionally-
imposed duty of creating a 'general and uniform system of education.'" (quoting MINN.
CONST. art. XIII, but omitting the word "public" before "education")); Dietz, supra note
122, at 1205 (noting that in Rhode Island students "have a right to an adequate education
with essentially no way to enforce it judicially").
169. Enrich, supra note 135, at 174, 175; cf Dietz, supra note 122, at 1207-12 (calling
this the "intrusive approach" because it either constrains the legislature with details or
implements goals that are impossibly high).
170. See Enrich, supra note 135, at 167.
171. See Thro, supra note 127, at 612.
172. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 107-08 (Ala. 1993) (upholding a lower
court ruling requiring that an adequate education give every child the opportunity to
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Typical capacities include: oral and written communication skills;
knowledge of economic, social, and political systems; sufficient
knowledge of governmental processes to enable the student to make
informed choices regarding his or her own governance; mathematic
and scientific skills; self-knowledge of health and mental wellness;
sufficient understanding of the arts to appreciate his or her cultural
heritage; sufficient academic or vocational training to enable students
to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and sufficient academic
or vocational training to enable students to compete favorably with
other students for jobs and further education. 73 As a result of these
high standards, the courts in these states have found constitutional
violations. 74
North Carolina's standard should be classified as a high
standard. North Carolina closely followed the form used in high-
standard states by listing several capacities required to meet the
adequacy standard. 75 Moreover, the North Carolina Supreme Court
directly cited the Kentucky and the West Virginia definitions when
formulating its own definition. 7 6 Thus, if history follows form, on
remand the trial court in Leandro is likely to find that the high
standards of a sound, basic education have been violated.
Formulating these definitions is not easy, 77 and a high adequacy
standard, such as the one adopted in North Carolina, requires a
complicated balancing of power between the judiciary and the
legislature.78 If the courts leave too many details to the legislature,
obtain nine specified capacities); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186,
212 (Ky. 1989) (requiring that each child have the opportunity to obtain seven skills in
order to meet the constitutional standard); McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of
Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993) (holding that each child should have the
opportunity to receive the same seven skills delineated in the Kentucky decision in order
to receive an adequate education); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979)
(requiring that each child master eight capacities to the best of their abilities).
173. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d at 107-08; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212;
McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877.
174. See supra notes 11, 134,137 and accompanying text.
175. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255; see also supra text accompanying
note 94 (setting forth the three factors).
176. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255 (citing Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212;
Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877).
177. The Kansas Supreme Court determined that a constitutional provision requiring
that the legislature make "suitable" provisions for school funding "does not imply any
objective, quantifiable ... standard against which schools can be measured by a court."
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. Kansas, 885 P.2d 1170, 1185 (Kan. 1994). Nebraska and
Tennessee both recognized that there was a quality standard under their constitutions, but
neither court defined that standard. See Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 1993);
Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139,156 (Tenn. 1993).
178. See Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d
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the judiciary may subsequently disagree with the legislature's
interpretation of these nebulous policy standards and find
enforcement difficult.179 Given great deference, the legislature may
lower the bar if its educational standards are challenged or if it finds
that the budget will not support the current educational program.
Yet, a detail-oriented policy approach leads the courts into the
unfamiliar territory of educational policy, which is usually reserved
for the legislature.8 0 More importantly, a detailed approach provides
the opportunity to adopt judicially enforceable substantive standards
that will allow the courts to remain in a traditional enforcement
role.' Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has initially
provided broad educational goals for a sound, basic education, in the
future the judiciary must remain cognizant of the delicate balance of
power between it and the legislature and of the implications a shift in
the balance may have for the level and stability of the minimum
qualitative level of adequacy.
The third question-whether a constitutional violation has
occurred-rests with the trial court on remand.lm1 The North
Carolina Supreme Court listed three factors to be used in
determining whether the state is providing students the opportunity
to receive a sound, basic education: legislative educational goals and
standards, students' performance on standardized tests, and the
state's general educational expenditures and per-pupil
expenditures.183 These factors may be used in a two-pronged analysis
to determine whether the State has violated its duty to provide a
400, 408 (Fla. 1996) (finding that the plaintiffs had failed to define an appropriate
adequacy standard that would not pose a substantial risk of intruding into the domain of
the legislature).
179. See McUsic, supra note 8, at 332 (suggesting that the court could find
enforcement difficult without designating quantifiable standards); Dietz, supra note 122,
at 1203 (finding that "a court must carefully craft definitional standards so as to maintain
both legitimacy and enforceability").
180. See Enrich, supra note 135, at 171-72 (recognizing that defining adequacy forces
courts to enter the realm of policy decisions usually reserved for legislatures); Dietz,
supra note 122, at 1210-11 (noting that the Massachusetts court "defined the legislature's
policy objectives for them, leaving only the details of implementation"). This division-of-
powers argument was advanced by the State in Leandro. See Leandro v. State, 122 N.C.
App. 1, 11, 468 S.E.2d 543, 550 (1996), rev'd in part and affd in part, 346 N.C. 336, 488
S.E.2d 249 (1997).
181. See McUsic, supra note 8, at 330-31 (finding that incorporating standardized test
results into the adequacy standard will allow courts to avoid playing the role of legislator
or educator).
182 See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 355,488 S.E.2d at 259.
183. See id. at 355-56, 488 S.E.2d at 259-60; see also supra notes 94-100 and
accompanying text (describing the three factors and the North Carolina Supreme Court's
thoughts on each).
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sound, basic education. The first step gauges whether the current
educational goals and standards adopted by the legislature are
capable, in theory, of providing children with the skills that comprise
a sound, basic education."8 If the current educational program in
North Carolina is insufficient to provide these skills, then the State
will have failed to provide the fundamental right to an adequate
education."8 5 In the second step, the latter two factors (standardized
test results and educational funding) are used as measuring sticks to
judge whether North Carolina's current educational program is, in
fact, providing students an opportunity to receive a sound, basic
education.
The first step in determining whether the State has violated its
constitutional duty is to ascertain whether North Carolina's current
legislative programs are capable of providing a sound, basic
education. In order to do this, it is necessary to examine the current
legislative educational goals and standards. 6 This Note compares
North Carolina's statutory educational programs and those of
Kentucky, which has similar constitutional adequacy requirements.
This comparison, combined with the supreme court's reluctance to
encroach on the legislature's domain, shows that the basic statutory
framework for education will likely remain intact. Three major
educational programs will be examined: the BEP,187 the School-
Based Management and Accountability Program (the "ABCs
Plan"),181 and the Excellent Schools Act.18 9
The legislature's qualitative educational goals are primarily
found in the BEP. The BEP was intended to provide all North
Carolina students with a comprehensive educational program.'
Under the BEP, the state funds an approved program that includes
"a core curriculum, performance and promotion standards, remedial
184. For the purposes of this first step, the current educational goals and standards are
assumed to be operating as provided in legislative provisions.
185. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261. Unless the State can prove that
a compelling governmental interest is the reason for denying this right, the trial court will
be compelled to grant the plaintiffs' relief. See id.
186. These legislative goals and standards, as discussed in this analysis, do not
encompass the statutory framework for funding educational programs. For a discussion
on the school funding aspects of the educational statutes, see supra notes 106-21 and
accompanying text.
187. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81 (1997).
188. Id. § 115C-105; see also Mesibov, supra note 73, at 1 (stating that this act is better
known as the ABCs Plan).
189. Excellent Schools Act, ch. 221, 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 231 (codified at
scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 115C).
190. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2137.
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programs, and requirements regarding class size, staffing, equipment,
and facilities." 191  The BEP's core curriculum requires that every
student receive instruction in "the areas of the arts, communication
skills, physical education and personal health and safety,
mathematics, media and computer skills, science, second languages,
social studies, and vocational and technical education.' ' 2
The rural districts asserted that the BEP cannot provide their
students with an adequate education. 193 They argued that, even if
they received the required programs and classes, 94 the lack of a
requirement for advanced courses' 95 indicates that the BEP fails to
fully incorporate the necessities for an adequate education.'96 If the
rural districts can prove on remand that optional courses, such as
calculus and advanced science classes, are necessary to meet one or
more of the four requirements of a sound, basic education, the trial
court would be forced to remedy these shortcomings, absent a
compelling governmental interest in not providing these courses.197
The ABCs Plan9 s is a program designed to improve student
performance by holding individual schools accountable for their
students' results on statewide standardized tests.199 The primary goal
of the ABCs Plan is to improve student performance by setting
annual performance goals that focus on: (1) student performance in
basics in elementary and middle schools, (2) student performance in
courses required for graduation in high school, and (3) holding
191. Liner, supra note 37, at 30.
192. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81(al).
193. See Plaintiffs-Appellants' New Brief at 44, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520). On the
other hand, the urban districts stated that current state "statutes, regulations, resolutions,
and other pronouncements" do provide for an adequate education. Intervening
Complaint at 10, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520). In fact, the urban districts pointed out to
the supreme court that the BEP provides guidance as to what constitutes an adequate
education. See Plaintiff-Intervenors-Appellants' New Brief at 19, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-
520).
194. The rural districts asserted that they were not receiving the required programs
and classes due to a lack of funding. See Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 60, Leandro
(No. 94-CVS-520).
195. These advanced courses include calculus, advanced biology, advanced chemistry,
advanced physics, journalism, and creative writing. See Plaintiffs-Appellants' New Brief
at 44, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520).
196. See id. The rural districts allege that their districts cannot afford to provide the
programs, such as calculus and advanced science classes, not required by the BEP. See
infra note 249 and accompanying text. The rural districts view these classes as a necessity
for an adequate education. See Plaintiffs-Appellants' New Brief at 44, Leandro (No. 94-
CVs-520).
197. See supra note 185.
198. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-105 (1997).
199. See id. § 115C-105.27.
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schools accountable for educational growth of students.2 °° The ABCs
Plan attempts to accomplish these goals by implementing several
steps at the school level.201 First, the State Board of Education must
set annual performance standards for each school to measure the
growth of student achievement.2°2  Second, each school must
formulate a school improvement plan through a school improvement
team.0 3 Third, the school's performance is based on end-of-grade
examinations in core classes.204  Fourth, individual schools are
accountable for their performance. If a school exceeds its goals, the
school will receive recognition and possible financial rewards.2 5 If a
school fails to meet its minimum growth standard and the majority of
students are performing below grade level, the school is held
accountable and steps are taken to improve the school's
performance. 206
The ABCs Plan and the Excellent Schools Act2 7 attempt to
increase the quality of teaching in North Carolina Schools. The
ABCs Plan directs the State Board of Education to develop a plan
that encourages teachers to seek employment with or remain
employed in low-performing schools.28 The specific goals of the
Excellent Schools Act are to concentrate student learning in the core
academic areas, improve teacher skills to enhance student
200. See Mesibov, supra note 73, at 2.
201. By focusing at the school level, the state addressed the urban districts' plight,
where the entire district performs adequately, but schools in poor areas suffer from low
test scores. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. The ABCs Plan is designed to help
low-performing schools. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-105.20(b)(3).
202. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-105.20; see also id §§ 115C-174.10 to .11 (containing
the purposes and components of the testing program).
203. See Mesibov, supra note 73, at 6.
204. See id at 2. The State Board of Education has been directed to "implement high
school exit exams, grade-level student proficiency benchmarks, ... and student
proficiency benchmarks for the knowledge and skills necessary to enter the workforce."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-12(9b).
205. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-105.20 (providing that schools that meet or exceed
their goals will receive recognition); id. § 115C-105.36 (providing that personnel in
schools that meet or exceed their goals are eligible for financial reward); Act of Aug. 28,
1997, ch. 443, § 8.36, 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 323, 395 (appropriating money to
provide bonuses of up to $1500 for teachers and teacher assistants in schools that achieve
higher than expected under the ABCs Plan).
206. Several consequences could result: each school must notify the parents of its
students of its low-performing status; the state may assign an assistance team to aid the
school in meeting its goals; and if the assistance team fails to improve the school's
performance, the state is authorized to dismiss school personnel. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 115C-105.37 to .39.
207. Excellent Schools Act, ch. 221, 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 231 (codified at
scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 115C).
208. See Mesibov, supra note 73, at 2.
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performance, and reward teachers for their improved skills and
improved student performance. 20 9  The Excellent Schools Act
attempts to attain these goals by testing the competency of teachers
in low-performing schools, 210 enhancing the standards for teacher
preparation programs,2" providing for more rigorous and frequent
evaluations before granting a teacher tenure,212 streamlining the
process for removing poor teachers,21 3 and increasing the salary of
teachers.214  These acts, if successful, would alleviate many of the
cponcerns of the plaintiffs about attracting the best teachers and, as
recognized by Leandro, require additional funding for schools across
the state.21 5
It is instructive to examine the educational reform in a state that
has previously granted the right to an adequate education in order to
predict whether North Carolina's current educational programs will
pass the first prong. In Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.,216
the Kentucky Supreme Court struck down the entire Kentucky
education system.17  In response, the legislature adopted a
comprehensive educational reform package called the Kentucky
Educational Reform Act ("KERA"),2 18 which "mandated school-
209. See Excellent Schools Act, ch. 221, 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 231,233.
210. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-105.38A (1997). If teachers in low performing
schools fail to pass a general competency exam three times, the State Board of Education
will begin dismissal proceedings. See id.
211. See id. § 115C-296.
212. See id. § 115C-326.
213. See id. § 115C-325.
214. See Excellent Schools Act, ch. 221, 1997 N.C. Legis. Serv. 231,262-67.
215. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 356-57, 488 S.E.2d at 260. Ironically, the provision of
bonuses for teachers in schools that perform above their expectations may inhibit low-
performing schools from attracting teachers. See Michele Kurtz, Teachers See
Disincentive to Helping Low-Rated Schools, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 18,
1998, at Al (recognizing that this disincentive is a very serious problem).
216. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1986). Rose was one of the first and most successful
adequacy cases, and its reasoning served as a model for subsequent decisions. See
McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993)
(adopting the Kentucky standard as its own interpretation of the educational guarantees
under the Massachusetts Constitution); John A. Nelson, Adequacy in Education: An
Analysis of the Constitutional Standard in Vermont, 18 VT. L. REV. 7, 47 (1993) (viewing
Kentucky's standard as a model).
217. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215. In Rose, numerous school districts and students sued
Kentucky, claiming that the state school system violated the Kentucky Constitution. See
id. at 190. The plaintiffs maintained that the state failed to "provide for an efficient
system of common schools throughout the State," as required by § 183 of the Kentucky
Constitution. Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court found that the state failed to meet the
provisions of § 183, which required "equal educational opportunities" and an "adequate"
education. See id. at 212-13.
218. Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990, ch. 476, 1990 Ky. Acts 1208 (codified as
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based decision making, statewide curriculum frameworks, and an
ambitious accountability system with rewards and sanctions for
schools tied to the achievement of high academic standards for all
students."2 19 The details of KERA are strikingly similar to North
Carolina's BEP and ABCs Plan. KERA, like the BEP, provides a
statewide model curriculum, although KERA is directly tied to the
required educational capacities under Rose.'0 KERA, like the ABCs
Plan, also provides greater control over school governance at the
local level and holds low performing schools accountable. " 1 KERA
has produced encouraging results since its inception.' Thus, the
reform undertaken in KERA is quite similar to the educational
system found in North Carolina.'
Unlike the Kentucky Supreme Court, the trial court in Leandro
will likely not direct that the current statutory framework be
completely reworked for several reasons. First, the plaintiff-parties
did not seek a complete overhaul of North Carolina's current
education system. The rural districts argued that the BEP failed to
provide certain courses necessary for an adequate education, 2 4 but
amended in scattered sections of KY. REv. STAT. ANN. chs. 156-65 and other scattered
chapters). In 1990, KERA formed the most comprehensive level of reform, beyond
which any other state had ever attempted. See C. Scott Trimble & Andrew C. Forsaith,
Achieving Equity and Excellence in Kentucky Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 599,
609 (1995).
219. Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 218, at 599.
220. Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.6451 (Michie 1996) (providing for a
statewide model curriculum), with supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text (discussing
the curriculum required under the BEP).
221. Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.6453 (Michie 1996) (requiring the
Kentucky Board of Education to create a performance-based assessment program to
ensure school accountability), and id. § 158.6455 (providing a system of rewards for
successful schools and sanctions for low-performing schools), and id. § 160.345
(implementing school-based decisionmaking over a wide variety of issues), with supra
notes 198-208 and accompanying text (describing the ABCs Plan).
222. See John Waldron, Education and Equality: The Battle for School Funding
Reform, HUM. RTS., Summer 1997, at 10, 17 (recognizing that "student performance in
reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social studies increased 19% between 1992
and 1994").
223. KERA remains valid law. KERA has survived an attack on the grounds that it
delegated too much authority to local school councils. See Board of Educ. v. Bushee, 889
S.W.2d 809, 816 (1994) (analyzing KERA by considering it in the historical context of
Rose). KERA has also survived an attack on its anti-nepotism provisions, see KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 160.180, 160.380 (Michie 1994), which prevent school board members and
school employees from being closely related, see Chapman v. Gorman, 839 S.W.2d 232,
242 (1992) (finding that the Rose decision would support characterizing the General
Assembly's passage of anti-nepotism statutes as rational).
224. See Plaintiff-Appellants' New Brief at 44, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520).
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that the BEP did provide "useful benchmarks."' The urban districts
asserted that the current system did have the capability of providing
an adequate education.26 Thus, the only allegation of inadequacy to
the educational programs could be remedied by supplementing the
required curriculum with additional courses. Second, the supreme
court recognized that the legislature is the better forum for
determining what educational programs are required to provide a
sound, basic education 227 Consequently, North Carolina courts will
intrude into the legislature's province only upon a clear showing that
the State has failed to provide a sound, basic education, granting
every reasonable deference to the State. 8  Third, the core
curriculum in the current BEP generally requires teaching the same
sound, basic education skills listed by the supreme court in
Leandro.229 Fourth, the current North Carolina system mirrors, in
many respects, the successful educational reform in Kentucky, which
was created in response to a judicial ruling granting educational
adequacy as a constitutional right 30 Thus, the trial court in Leandro
will likely follow the existing standards, with possible slight
variations?3'
The second step in determining whether the state has provided
an adequate education is to measure the performance of the current
educational system3 2 Standardized tests and the state's educational
225. See Plaintiff-Appellants' New Brief at 44, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520).
226. The urban districts stated that current state "statutes, regulations, resolutions,
and other pronouncements" do provide for an adequate education. Intervening
Complaint at 10, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520). In fact, the urban districts pointed out to
the supreme court that the BEP provides guidance as to what constitutes an adequate
education. See Plaintiff-Intervenors-Appellants' New Brief at 19, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-
520).
227. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 357,488 S.E.2d at 261.
228. See id.
229. Compare supra note 86 (quoting the skills requisite in a sound, basic education
under the supreme court's definition), with supra note 192 and accompanying text (listing
the requirements of the BEP's core curriculum).
230. See supra notes 216-23 and accompanying text.
231. See Dietz, supra note 122, at 1212-13 (arguing that following an existing standards
approach is the best means of resolving the school finance litigation because the court can
maintain its role of interpreter of the constitution and statutory language while retaining
an enforceable standard).
232. For purposes of the second step in this analysis, this Note measures the current
system's performance. This analysis assumes that the current system, or a slight deviation
therefrom, will be found capable of providing a sound, basic education. If the trial court
determined that the current system did not have the capacity to provide an adequate
education, the question of performance would be moot absent a compelling state interest
for failing to provide a sound, basic education. This second step can be utilized only after
an educational program is deemed capable of providing a sound, basic education.
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funding are used as determining factors in gauging that
performance . 33 Because the basic education framework is likely to
remain intact,' this step becomes critical in determining whether the
State has met its constitutional duties.
Before analyzing whether a violation has occurred using
standardized test results as the measuring stick, it is important to
recognize that the supreme court clearly indicated that it favors the
use of standardized tests?5  The supreme court appeared to value
highly the use of standardized test results, finding that test results
"may be more reliable" than educational funding in measuring the
quality of education? 6  Although acknowledging that standardized
tests are still controversial and that they should not be used as
"absolute authorit[y]," the court recognized the tests as useful
indicators of the quality of education?17 Indeed, standardized tests
are the most logical means of testing whether a child is receiving a
minimum qualitative level of education. 8
The evidence that will be exhibited on remand using the
standardized test results will be dramatic, perhaps more so for the
rural districts. Standardized test scores for students in rural school
systems are abysmal.? 9 In 1994, six school systems were categorized
as "warning-status" systems for failure to meet the new
accountability standards; of those six, four are rural districts in the
suit.2 4 In contrast, the urban districts did not submit any specific
standardized test scores to the supreme court, so it is unclear what
the test results for the urban districts will be on remand.24' However,
233. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 355-56, 488 S.E.2d at 259-60 (recognizing standardized
test results and the state's level of educational expenditures as factors to be used on
remand in determining whether the state is providing children the opportunity to receive
a sound, basic education).
234. See supra notes 224-31 and accompanying text.
235. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 355-57, 488 S.E.2d at 259-60.
236. Id. at 355,488 S.E.2d at 260 (citing McUsic, supra note 8, at 329).
237. Id.
238. See MeUsic, supra note 8, at 330 (noting that minimum qualitative educational
standards may readily be measured by standardized tests).
239. See supra note 39.
240. See Plaintiff's Amended Complaint 75, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520) (alleging
that four of the rural districts were failing under the Performance Based Accountability
Program under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.1-38.4 (recodified as § 115C-105.20 to .35));
see also LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 33, at 4 (noting that four of the five
plaintiffs in Leandro were considered warning-status systems).
241. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (noting that the only test score
submitted by the plaintiff-intervenors was the percentage of their students failing to
complete the minimum courses required for admission to the University of North
Carolina system).
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it is clear that the urban districts' claims rest largely on test scores in
schools with large concentrations of students from socio-
economically deprived families rather than on district-wide student
assessments.242 Focusing on the level of the individual school, rather
than on the district level, comports with the legislative goals in the
ABCs Plan.243 Thus, both the rural and urban districts should be able
to make strong claims that the State's current educational programs
are inadequate as reflected by standardized test scores.
A determination of whether a violation occurred using the
state's level of educational funding as a measuring stick should be
prefaced by reiterating the supreme court's skepticism of utilizing
funding as a measure of an adequate education.244 The supreme court
acknowledged the existence of a major debate surrounding the
effects of educational expenditures on the quality of education
imparted to students.2 45 The court seemed to concede that large
increases in funding may produce modest increases in the quality of
education.246 Nevertheless, despite recognition of the dubious
correlation between funding and the quality of education, the
supreme court chose to include the level of the state's funding as a
factor.247
A determination of whether the State's education program
242. See Intervening Complaint 47, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520).
243. See supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
245. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 356, 488 S.E.2d at 260 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973)).
246. See id. (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 70 (1995)); Clune, supra note 99,
at 726; see also supra note 98 and accompanying text (elaborating on the cases cited by
the North Carolina Supreme Court to exemplify its misgiving about the correlation
between money and the quality of education).
247. It is not entirely clear why the court included funding as a factor. There are at
least three possible explanations. First, the court could be alluding to the legislature's
general appropriations for the state's educational programs. The supreme court cited the
percentage of the general fund operating appropriations dedicated to education. See
Leandro, 346 N.C. at 356-57, 488 S.E.2d at 260. However, the state's percentage of the
general fund appropriated for education cannot logically be an appropriate measure of an
adequate education, given the court's skepticism of the correlation between funding and
quality of education. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. Second, the court may be
referring to current educational programs, such as the BEP, that are not fully funded by
the legislature. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. Thus, this factor could be
intended to ensure that the legislature properly appropriates funds for existing
educational programs and standards. Third, there is obviously a minimum level of
funding that will be required to offer students whatever educational program is deemed a
sound, basic education. The courts could say with reasonable certainty that without X
number of dollars, a school district of Y students cannot provide the educational
programs required to provide the opportunity to receive a sound, basic education.
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passes constitutional muster under a funding analysis will likely result
in the finding of a violation of the constitutional duties of the State.
The court will recognize clear shortcomings in legislative goals due to
insufficient appropriations. The BEP, the foundation of the State's
educational programs, has never been fully funded.2 48  The rural
districts alleged that the State's own reports recognized that students
in their districts did not have access to certain programs and classes
required by the BEP, due to lack of funding.24 9 If school districts are
unable to provide the educational programs deemed necessary for an
adequate education as a result of any lack of state funding, this would
be a violation of the BEP.50 In addition to the BEP, the legislature
has shown one of its goals as decreasing the gap in per-pupil spending
between poor and wealthy districts by passing legislation to
supplement funding in low-wealth counties." However, as with the
BEP, the legislature has failed to provide sufficient funds to meet its
goal of reducing funding disparities between rich and poor districts.12
The legislature initially projected the need for additional funds at
$200 million, but this figure was halved to $100 million in 1993.1
Thus, the court will likely be persuaded that the plaintiff-parties have
made a showing of violation under the funding factor.
Although the trial court may use either or both standardized test
248. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 343, 488 S.E.2d at 252. According to the statute: "It is
the goal of the General Assembly that the Basic Education Program be fully funded and
completely operational in each local administrative unit by July 1, 1995." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-81(a) (1997). As of 1994, the BEP was under-funded by about $333 million.
See LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 33, at 2.
249. See Plaintiff's Amended Complaint 60, Leandro (No. 94-CVS-520).
250. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81(al) (providing that North Carolina "shall provide
every student in the State equal access to a Basic Education Program").
251. See Act of July 9, 1993, ch. 321, § 138, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 649, 789-94
(providing supplemental funds to low-wealth school districts), amended by Act of July 16,
1994, ch. 769, § 19.32, 1994 N.C. Sess. Laws 751, 865-70. In addition to closing the funding
gap, the General Assembly intended that the supplemental funding also "enhance the
instructional program and student achievement" in low-wealth school districts. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 115C-81(a).
252. See LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 33, at 5 (concluding that the
supplemental funding has only slowed the widening gap). The trial court will find that the
funding gap between the plaintiff school districts and plaintiff-intervenor school districts
has only decreased slightly since the supplemental funding program was enacted in 1993.
In the 1992-93 school year, the difference in total funding between the plaintiff school
districts and plaintiff-intervenor school districts was $761. See STATISTICAL PROFILE
1994, supra note 117, at 54-56 (excluding child nutrition funds). In the 1995-96 school
year, that gap had only shrunk to $658. See STATISTICAL PROFILE 1997, supra note 34, at
54-56 (excluding child nutrition funds). See also supra note 117 (showing that the gap
between the school districts with the ten highest and ten lowest total per pupil
expenditures has increased during this same time period).
253. See LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 33, at 2.
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results and state funding levels to determine whether the current
system is in fact providing the opportunity to receive an adequate
education, the court should predominantly rely on standardized
testing. An adequacy standard requires that the quality of education
be measured. Although standardized tests are not perfect,2 the use
of standardized tests is the best means for measuring the quality of
education received by students5 5 In order for funding to be used as
a qualitative measure of education, the court must accept that money
spent is linked to the quality of education received. 6 However, the
supreme court is clearly skeptical of this link5 7 Moreover, funding is
a poor measure of adequacy because a dollar cannot purchase the
same amount of education in a small school district as it can in a large
school district58 Despite the fact that funding is an easier factor to
quantify,259 standardized testing is a superior means of testing the
qualitative level of education.2 °
There are numerous possible outcomes on remand. Of course,
the trial court may determine that the State did not violate the
students' right to an adequate education. At the other extreme, the
trial court may find a violation and completely reject the existing
statutory framework. If this occurs, there is no precedent as to what
form of relief the court will fashion.261 However, if the trial court
254. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 355, 488 S.E.2d at 260 (recognizing that the value of
standardized tests is still debated).
255. See McUsic, supra note 8, at 316 (finding that the level of education received is
best measured by standardized tests).
256. See id. at 310 (noting that it is preferable for litigants to avoid having to prove a
link between money spent and educational quality).
257. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. Theoretically, a school district could
spend well above a required level of expenditures while failing to graduate any students
and still be deemed to have provided the opportunity for an adequate education. This is
clearly against the spirit of the opinion, which requires that education prepare students to
participate and compete in society. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 345,488 S.E.2d at 254.
258. The marginal per-pupil costs of educating children varies with the size of schools.
See ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra note 33, at 13 (recognizing that the marginal cost
per student of an instructional program is more expensive in the smaller schools in North
Carolina because the state provides roughly equal amounts of funding per student
regardless of the size of the school). This marginal cost difference can be dramatic. See
id. (finding that the per-student cost of teachers was $1298 in a class of 26 students versus
$2813 in a class of 12 students).
259. See McUsic, supra note 8, at 316.
260. See id.
261. This complete rejection would be similar to the Rose decision, but since the North
Carolina statutes already mirror those of Kentucky, there is no indication of what relief
might be granted. See supra notes 111-14, 190-92, 198-206 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the North Carolina BEP and ABCs Program, and supra notes 218-23 and
accompanying text for a discussion of KERA.
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finds the current educational statutes helpful, there are several
approaches the court could take.2 62 The trial court could approve the
existing statutory framework but insist that the BEP and
Supplemental Funding be fully funded.263  Alternatively, the court
could direct the State to fully fund the statutory educational
provisions and require the State to make alterations to the current
system.264 The court could also take a more deferential approach,
adopting the position that the current system is sufficient and that the
new educational programs adopted by the legislature have not had
time to bring about results.265
If the trial court does find a violation266 and uses standardized
tests as the predominant factor in measuring adequacy,267 difficult
questions arise as to the scope of future causes of action. The
legislature has stated its belief that "all children can learn,2 68 and the
supreme court held that every child is guaranteed the opportunity to
receive a sound, basic education.269 But if a school district provides
an adequate educational program, with adequate funding, and one
child fails to perform "adequately" on standardized tests, does that
lone child have a cause of action against the State? Fundamentally, if
the State subscribes to the theory that every child is capable of
learning if provided with the proper instruction, the answer to that
question is in the affirmative. These policy standards imply that the
failure of any child to receive an adequate education will provide a
cause of action against the State 70 However, this would clearly be
262. The trial court must seriously look at the current system because this would
certainly lead to the least "encroachment upon the other branches of government," as
directed by the supreme court. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261.
263. By taking this approach, the court would appear to be serving as a "backstop" to
the legislature's educational goals. See Enrich, supra note 135, at 176.
264. The court could require the State Board of Education to adopt the definition of a
sound, basic education as the goal of the public school system, as in Kentucky. See
Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 218, at 606. The court could also require that the
curriculum of the BEP be expanded to include courses such as calculus. See supra note
224 and accompanying text.
265. The Kentucky court assumed that it will take 20 years to reach the established
goals. See Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 218, at 648. However, the trial court should be
reluctant to allow the state to monitor its own programs for constitutional validity
because such monitoring rarely results in a finding of a violation. See Thro, supra note
127, at 613.
266. This Note suggests that a violation is likely. See supra notes 239-43, 248-53, and
accompanying text.
267. This Note suggests that the court's reliance on this factor is the most logical. See
supra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
268. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81, -105.20 (1997).
269. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 347,488 S.E.2d at 255.
270. See Thro, supra note 127, at 613. The court was clearly aware of this when it
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an unworkable standard.271 At the other extreme, the courts could
severely limit the scope of the right by holding that every child who
attended a school with an adequate instructional program and
funding is deemed to have received his opportunity to receive a
sound, basic education, regardless of the fact that the entire school
may have failed to be promoted to the next grade level.2 72 Obviously,
a practical standard that best ensures that all children receive a
minimum qualitative level of education is somewhere in the middle.
Given the importance of the scope of the constitutional claim, the
courts may defer to the legislature to define the limits of the
constitutional claim.273
Whatever the results on remand, Leandro is an important step in
improving the level of education in North Carolina. The right to an
adequate education shifts the education debate from money to
results.274 Although improvements in the quality of education will
not be instantaneous,275 at least one state has seen marked
improvement after moving to an adequacy standard.2 76 Hopefully,
over time, every child in North Carolina, no matter where he or she
resides, will be afforded a substantive, meaningful education at the
end of the bus ride.2 77
WILLIAM KENT PACKARD
limited the constitutional guarantee to an opportunity to receive a sound, basic education,
and this Note suggests that current legislation can effectively deal with this mandate by
focusing efforts for enforcement at the school level.
271. The courts could possibly be flooded with claims by parents who want their
children to succeed.
272. This approach is analogous to simply relying on funding. Just because schools
have the resources to provide appropriate facilities, curricula, teachers, and textbooks
does not mean that the children will learn.
273. The threshold for deeming a school "low-performance" under the ABCs Plan
may provide a good framework. See supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text
(describing the ABCs Plan).
274. See William H. Clune, Educational Adequacy A Theory and Its Remedies, 28 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 481,485 (1995).
275. See Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 218, at 648 (noting that the Kentucky
Supreme Court assumed that it would take 20 years to reach the established goals).
276. See Waldron, supra note 222, at 17 (recognizing that student performance in
Kentucky in reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social studies increased 19%
between 1992 and 1994).
277. See Ford, supra note 156, at A28 (quoting Chief Justice Mitchell's question during
oral argument: " 'Shouldn't there be something at the end of the bus ride?' ").
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